Discriminatory legislation or a policy formulated, principles enumerated
S J Tubrazy
It would not be enough to say that a piece of legislation or a policy formulated thereunder is discriminatory but it is to be substantiated by applying certain well entrenched principles on the subject of discriminatory legislation which are as follows:
(i) The expression ‘equality before law’ or the ‘equal protection of law’ does not mean that it secures to all persons the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. It only requires that all persons similarly situated or circumstanced shall be treated alike.
(ii) The guarantee of equal protection of law does not mean that all laws must be general in character and universal in application and the State has no power to distinguish and classify persons or things for the purpose of legislation.
(iii) The guarantee of equal protection of laws forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. The guarantee does not prohibit discrimination with respect to things that are different. The State has the power to classify persons or things and to make laws applicable only to the persons or things within the class.
(iv) The classification, if it is not to offend against the constitutional guarantee must be based upon some intelligible differential bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation.
(v) Reasonableness of classification is a matter for the courts to determine and when determining this question, the courts may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and to sustain the classification, they must assume the existence of any state of facts which can reasonably be conceived to exist at the time of the legislation.
(vi) The classification will not be held to be invalid merely because the law might have been extended to other persons who in some respect might resemble the class for which the law is made because the legislature is the best judge of the needs of particular classes and the degree of harm so as to adjust its legislation according to the exigencies found to exist.
(vii) One who assails the classification must show that it does not rest on any reasonable basis.
(viii) Where the legislature lays down the law and indicates the persons or things to whom its provisions are intended to apply and leaves the application of law to an administrative authority while indicating the policy and purpose of law and laying down the standards or norms for the guidance of the designated, authority in exercise of its powers, no question of violation of Article 25 arises. In case, however, the designated authority abuses its powers or transgresses the limits when exercising the power, the actual order of the authority and not the State would be condemned as unconstitutional.
(ix) Where the State itself does not make any classification of persons or things and leaves it in the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things, without laying down any principle or policy to guide the Government in the exercise of discretion, the statute will be struck down on the ground of making excessive delegation of power to the Government so as to enable it to discriminate between the persons or the things similarly situated.
(Balochistan Bar Association v. Government of Balochistan PLD 1991 Quetta 7 and Ziaullah Khan v. Government of Punjab PLD 1989 Lah. 554)